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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 53Abstract
This paper shows how any steady state distribution of ages and
related hazard rates can be represented as a distribution across ￿rms
of completed contract lengths. The distribution is consistent with
a Generalised Taylor Economy or a Generalised Calvo model with
duration dependent reset probabilities. Equivalent distributions have
di⁄erent degrees of forward lookingness and imply di⁄erent behaviour
in response to monetary shocks. We also interpret data on the pro-
portions of ￿rms changing price in a period, and the resultant range
of average contract lengths.
JEL: E50.




Working Paper Series No 676
September 2006Non-Technical Summary. 
 
The concept of nominal rigidity captures the frequency with which wage 
or price-setters (hereafter “firms”) review and reset wages and prices.  In 
a perfect market, wages and prices will be perfectly flexible and vary so 
as to be at their optimal level reflecting the current demand and cost 
conditions facing the firm.  The current generation of models used in 
analyzing the effects of monetary policy (the new neoclassical synthesis 
models) adopt a model of inertia based on a variety of dynamic pricing 
models. The most commonly used pricing models are the Taylor model of 
staggered contracts of a fixed and known duration and the Calvo model 
where the contract length is random (both assume that the wage or price 
is fixed over the contract length).   
The purpose of this paper is to provide a unified framework for 
modelling the distribution of contract durations which will be 
comparable across different types of dynamic pricing models and which 
will give a guide as to how to interpret empirical data. 
If we look at an economy, we will observe some wages and prices 
changing in each period and a resultant distribution of durations.  In 
steady state this distribution is the same in each period.  There are four 
different ways of looking at the same steady state distribution of contract 
durations.  First, we can take a census at a point in time and look at how 
long the wages and prices at that moment have been in force: that is, we 
measure the age distribution of contracts.  Second, we can look at the 
hazard rates for various ages, the proportion of contracts which terminate 
at each age.  Third, we can look at the population of contracts and their 
distribution. Lastly, we introduce the new concept of the distribution of 
contracts durations across firms DAF. This takes the same cross-section 
at a moment in time as the age distribution, but looks at the distribution of 
completed contract lengths associated with it, rather than the age.  The 
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September 2006contracts we get 8/5 priods. However, if we average across firms we get 
the much longer 3 periods.  I believe that many existing studies use the 
statistical methodology developed for the distribution of contracts not for 
the DAF, and hence have not captured the correct measure of nominal 
rigidity.   
In this paper, we develop a series of identities by which from any 
of the four ways of representing the steady state you can recover the 
other three  (Proposition 1 and Corollary 1). 
  We then link the statistical models to theoretical pricing models. 
Firstly, we generalise the standard Taylor model to allow for a 
distribution of known contract lengths, the Generalised Taylor Economy 
(GTE): this corresponds to the DAF.  Secondly, the Generalised Calvo 
model with duration dependent reset probabilities corresponds to the  
Hazard rate representation.  We are then in a position to compare 
different pricing models for the same distribution of contract lengths.  We 
use the example of the Multiple Calvo model (one where there are many 
sectors, each with a sector specific Calvo reset probability), showing how 
the same distribution can be modelled as a GTE (where firms know the 
contract length ex ante) or as a Generalised Calvo model (where the 
contract lengths are uncertain).  We find that for a given distribution of 
contract lengths, the GTE is more myopic than the GC or MC which put 
the same weight on the future. 
This paper argues that the DAF is the relevant way of 
understanding nominal rigidity:  because it is firms that set prices or 
wages, we need to measure nominal rigidity across firms. 
  A commonly used framework  for measuring nominal rigidity is to 
look at the distribution of contract durations. A simple example will show 
the DAF differs from this.  Suppose we have two firms: F1 sets a 
different price each period, F4 once every four periods.  Suppose we take 
a four period sample.  We will observe 5 contracts or price-spells: four 
for firm F1 and one for F4
1.  If we take the average contract length across 
                                                 
1 We assume that the contract commences in the first period. 
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September 2006mean contract length across contracts, you get only 2.7 quarters: this is 
far too short and means that there is over-sampling of short contracts.  We 
also ask what is the shortest mean contract length consistent with a given 
proportion of firms changing prices: we find that this is the reciprocal of 
the proportion (proposition 3) and that the maximum mean is proportional 
to the longest contract length (Proposition 4).  Lastly, we generate the 
Impulse-response functions  (IR) for a simple model and compare them 
for the B-K distribution: we find the IR  of the MC and the GC are similar; 
that of the GTE  reflects is more myopic pricing rule. 
The majority of theoretical calibrations and existing empirical 
work on nominal rigidity are using the wrong statistical framework for 
measuring nominal rigidity. The identities put forward in this paper 
provide a fuller understanding of how pricing models and data can be 
linked together. 
The methodology is applied to the Bils-Klenow (2004) data set 
wuich gives the average proportion of firms resetting prices for 354 
categories used in the US CPI for the period 1995-7.  We find that the 
mean contract length across firms is 4.4 quarters, which fits in well with 
the notion that the average duration of a price is 4 quarters and is the 
correct measure of nominal rigidity.  If on the other hand you look at the 
7
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Dynamic pricing and wage-setting models have become central to macroeco-
nomic modelling in the new neoclassical synthesis approach: they are the
way that nominal rigidity is introduced into the macroeconomic system1.
The concept of nominal rigidity captures in some sense the frequency with
which wage and/or price setters reset or review wages and prices. It has be-
come apparent that di⁄erent models of pricing have di⁄erent implications for
matters such as the persistence of output, prices and in￿ ation to monetary
shocks. The question arises as to how the implications of models are linked
to the frequency with which wages or prices are reset and the resultant distri-
bution of contract lengths (where contract length refers to a completed wage
or price spell). In this paper I develop a uni￿ed approach which can be used
to understand and compare the distribution of contract durations implied by
models of price and wage-setting, and also empirical data on pricing. The
key point is that since we seek to understand nominal rigidity, we want to
measure the degree of price stickiness across wage and price setters ("￿rms"
hereafter): we want to know the average frequency of price adjustment and
mean duration of price or wage spells at the "￿rm" level. Much of existing
work on nominal rigidity has adopted a statistical framework that does not
take into account that prices are set by ￿rms, but treats each price spell as
an entity in itself: this gives rise to a mis-measurement of nominal rigidity
and has resulted in failing to compare di⁄erent pricing models consistently
(see for example Dixon and Kara 2006a).
We start from the idea of modelling the class of all steady state distribu-
tions of durations across a given population (in this case, the ￿rms or unions
that set prices or wages): we call this the distribution of durations across
￿rms (DAF). In steady state there are three equivalent ways of interpreting
the distribution of durations. First there is the cross-sectional distribution
of ages: how long has the price or wage contract lasted until now? This is
like the population census. Note that since there is one price set by each
￿rm, by taking a cross-section we are simultaneously ￿nding the distribution
of ages across current price spells and across ￿rms. Second, we can look at
the distribution in terms of survival probabilities: from the cross-section of
ages, what is the probability of progressing from one age to the next one. A
1See Goodfriend and King (1997), Erceg (1997), Clarida, Gertler and Gali (1999),
Ascari (2000) and Huang and Liu (2002) inter alia..
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No 676
September 2006third perspective is to take a cross-section of contracts that start at a point
in time, and ￿nd the distribution of completed contract lengths to which
this gives rise. In e⁄ect, this last distribution is not taken across all ￿rms,
but only across those ￿rms which reset wage or price: it is essentially a co-
hort distribution. Lastly, we can look at the cross-section of contracts in
steady-state across ￿rms and ask what is the distribution of completed con-
tract lengths (lifetimes) of this cross-section: in e⁄ect we are associating each
￿rm with a (completed) contract length to get a distribution of completed
contract lengths across ￿rms. The ￿rst three concepts (distribution of ages,
hazard rates and distribution across new starters) are very well understood
in statistics, being basic tools in demography, evolutionary biology and else-
where. The last concept, the distribution of completed durations across
the population of ￿rms is a more novel concept, but it is the key to under-
standing dynamic wage and price setting models since it is this concept that
determines nominal rigidity. The contribution of this paper is to provide a
set of steady state indentities between these four di⁄erent ways of looking at
the underlying steady state distribution: we can start from any of the ￿rst
three concepts to arrive at the fourth which corresponds to nominal rigidity.
In order to understand the di⁄erence between the DAF and the distri-
bution across new contracts, we can consider the following simple example.
Four ￿rms reset price every month. Another four ￿rms reset price once a
year: one ￿rm in each quarter. Suppose we take the cohort of ￿rms that
reset price in January. There are 5 ￿rms resetting prices: the average length
of contracts from this cohort is 8=3 months. If we look at the distribution of
contract lengths across all ￿rms, the average duration is 7 months. Clearly,
if we want to obtain a sensible measure of nominal rigidity, what matters is
the behaviour of all ￿rms which indicates that we should use the DAF; not
the distribution across new contracts. However, in calibrating the Calvo
model, existing studies tend to use the mean of the distribution across new
contracts, not across all ￿rms: hence the notion that a reset probability of
0:25 corresponds to an average contract length of 4 quarters - the average
across new contracts is indeed 4 quarters, but across all ￿rms is 7 quarters.
We link the statistical analysis of contracts across ￿rms to general models
of price and wage setting. First, the Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE)
introduced in Kara and Dixon (2005), which starts from the distribution of
completed contract lengths (lifetimes). There are many sectors, each with
sector speci￿c contract lengths. The simple Taylor economy where all con-
tract lengths are the same is a special case of the GTE. Secondly, adopting
9
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lengths are stochastic with a reset probability which may be constant (as in
the classical Calvo model) or duration dependent (Wolman 1999). We show
that the Calvo model with duration dependent reset probabilities (denoted
as the Generalized Calvo model GC) is coextensive with the set of all steady
state distributions: each possible steady state age distribution has exactly
one GC and one GTE which corresponds to it. Hence, using this frame-
work, we are able to compare the di⁄erent models of pricing for any given
distribution of durations across ￿rms. This enables us to isolate the precise
e⁄ect of the pricing model as opposed to the di⁄erence in the distribution
of contract lengths. As Dixon and Kara (2006a) showed, existing compar-
isons of simple Taylor and simple Calvo models of pricing have failed to even
ensure that the mean contract lengths are the same, let alone the overall
distribution of contract lengths across ￿rms (see for example Kiley 2002).
It is widely recognized that there is a variety of pricing or wage-setting
behaviour in most economies. This raises the question of aggregation: if
we seek to represent the economy with a particular model, is the model itself
consistent with this heterogeneity? This paper shows that both the GTE
and GC are closed under aggregation: if we combine two economies repre-
sented by a GTE, the resultant economy will also be a GTE. Likewise
the GC. More importantly, we show that this is not the case for either
the simple Taylor or Calvo models. If there is heterogeneity in the econ-
omy, then it cannot consistently be represented as a simple Taylor or Calvo
process (except possibly as a dubious approximation). However, another
generalization of the Calvo idea, the Multiple Calvo economy MC is closed
under aggregation. In the MC economy, there are many sectors, each with
a sector speci￿c reset probability.
Given that we have a particular distribution of durations, what di⁄erence
does the pricing model make? Following the analysis of Dixon and Kara
(2005), the concept of Forward Lookingness (FL) is employed: how far on
average do agents look forward (what is the weighted mean number of periods
price setters look forward when the set their price?). We ￿nd that in the
GTE model, ￿rms on average are more myopic than in the GC model for a
give distribution of durations. This leads to observable di⁄erences in impulse
response functions in response to monetary shocks.
We also apply this approach to the Bils-Klenow data set (Bils and Klenow
2004). From the sectoral data for the proportion of changes in prices per
month we are able to construct the average length of contracts under the
10
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shortest possible mean duration is achieved by the assumption that there is
the simplest GTE consistent with the observed proportion, which consists of
one or two consecutive contract durations that yield the observed proportion
of prices changing (Proposition 3). The longest possible mean is proportional
to the longest possible contract length (Proposition 4). This paper provides
not only a simple and transparent discrete time framework for understanding
nominal price rigidity in dynamic macromodels, but also indicates how em-
pirical evidence from price data can be applied in a consistent and relevant
manner.
In section 2 we review the well known facts about the steady state dis-
tribution of ages and hazard rates and durations across new contracts. We
then introduce the new concept of the distribution of durations across ￿rms
and show how all four concepts are related by simple identities which are
spreadsheet friendly. In section 3, we link the concepts to di⁄erent models
of pricing. In section 4 the issue of aggregation is considered. In section 5
we analyze the di⁄erent pricing models in terms of forward lookingness and
compare the mean reset prices. In section 6, we implement these ideas using
the Bils-Klenow data set.
2 Steady State Distributions of Durations across
Firms.
We will consider the steady-state demographics of contracts in terms of their
durations. The lifetime of a contract is how long it lasts from its start to its
￿nish, a completed duration. The age of a contract at time t is how long
it has been in force since it started. The age is a duration which may or
may not be completed. We will ￿rst review the well known representation
of steady state durations by the related concepts of the age distribution and
hazard rates (see for example, Kiefer 1988).
There is a continuum agents (we will call them ￿rms here) f which set
wages or prices represented by the unit interval f 2 [0;1]: In steady state
we can take a cross-section at time t and measure the age distribution2: ￿s
j





j=1 where F is
2In Demography, this is given the acronym SAD:
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monotonic: you cannot have more older people than younger, since to become
old you must ￿rst be young. Hence the set of all possible steady state age














An alternative way of looking at the steady state distribution of durations
is in terms of the hazard rate. The hazard rate at a particular age is the
proportion of contracts at age i which do not last any longer (contracts which
end at age i, people who die at age i). Hence the hazard rate can be de￿ned
in terms of the age distribution: given the distribution of ages in steady-state
￿s 2 ￿
F￿1








;i = 1:::(F ￿ 1) (1)
Corresponding to the idea of a hazard rate is that of the survival proba-
bility, the probability at birth that the price survives for at least i periods,




and we de￿ne the sum of survival probabilities ￿￿ and its reciprocal ￿ ! :
￿￿ =
PF
i=1 ￿i ￿ ! = ￿
￿1
￿
Clearly, we can invert (1): we have F ￿ 1 equations. Hence:
Observation 1 given ! 2 [0;1)F￿1; there exists a unique corresponding age





i = ￿ !￿i i = 1:::F.
3In some theoretical applications such as the Calvo model of pricing, there may be
in￿nite lifetimes. The analysis presented is consistent with that, although for all practical
applications a ￿nite maximum is required.
4Since the maximum length is F; without loss of genersality we set !F = 1. If !i = 1
for some i < F, then i is the maximum duration and subsequent hazard rates become
irrelevant. This leads to trivial non-uniqueness. We therefore de￿ne F as the shortest
duration with a reset probability of 1: Hence for i < F; !i 2 [0;1):
12
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￿i : ￿ ! = ￿
￿1
￿ ensures adding up. From observation 1 ￿s
1 = ￿ !. From
the de￿nition of hazard rates and Observation 1 we can move from an age
distribution ￿s 2 ￿
F￿1
M to the hazard pro￿le and vice versa.5
2.1 The Distribution of Completed Durations across
Firms.
Given a steady-state age distribution ￿s 2 ￿
F￿1
M , we can ask what is the
corresponding distribution of completed durations or lifetimes across ￿rms
￿ 2 ￿F￿1. Note, we are asking for the distribution across ￿rms (DAF).
There is a unit interval of ￿rms: each ￿rm sets one price. When we measure
the population shares ￿i, we are measuring across ￿rms, just as we do when
we take the age distribution. We are seeking to answer the question "what
is the distribution of completed across the population of ￿rms". The popu-
lation of ￿rms does not vary over time6, and that whilst some ￿rms change
price frequently and some infrequently, each individual ￿rm over time has
an average contract length, and the average in the economy is the average
over the stock of ￿rms. It is this that corresponds to the concept of price-
stickiness7.
We now derive the main results of the paper, which provides a framework
of steady state identities which links the three familiar concepts of age dis-
tribution, hazard rate and distribution across contracts to the distribution
of completed contract lengths across ￿rms, and hence to nominal rigidity of
prices and wages. First, we consider the relationship between the Hazard
pro￿le and the distribution of contract durations across ￿rms.
Proposition 1. (a) Consider any Hazard pro￿le ! 2 [0;1)F￿1: There exists
a unique distribution of lifetimes across ￿rms corresponding to !; ￿ 2
￿F￿1 where:
￿i = ￿ !:i:!i:￿i: i = 1:::F (2)
5 This relationship is one of the building blocks of Life Tables (Chiang 1984), which
are put to a variety of uses by demographers, actuaries and biologists.
6This comes from the assumption of a steady state.
7 The DAF is similar to the concept of the distribution of contract lengths across
workers employed by Taylor (1993, page 36) in his analysis of non-synchronised wage-
setting with di⁄erent contract lengths.
13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 676
September 2006(b) Consider any distribution of contract lengths across ￿rms given by
￿ 2 ￿F￿1. There exists a unique hazard pro￿le that will generate this










All proofs are in the appendix. Now, since there is a 1-1 relationship
between the hazard pro￿le and the distribution of contract lengths across
￿rms, and in addition we know that there is a 1-1 relation between the
hazard pro￿le and the age distribution, it follows that there must be a 1-1
relationship between the age distribution and the distribution of completed
contract lengths8.
Corollary 1 (a) Consider a steady-state age distribution ￿s 2 ￿
F￿1
M . There
exists a unique distribution of lifetimes across ￿rms ￿ 2 ￿F￿1 which













(b) Given a distribution of steady-state completed lifetimes across ￿rms,
￿ 2 ￿F￿1, there exists a unique ￿s 2 ￿
F￿1








j = 1:::F (4)
Lastly, we can also ask for a given distribution of contracts across ￿rms
￿ 2 ￿F￿1; or age distribution ￿s 2 ￿
F￿1
M or hazard pro￿le ! 2 [0;1)F￿1,
what is the corresponding distribution of durations taken across the total
















8Note that Corollary 1 is essentially a generalisation of Taylor￿ s 4 quarter example
(1993, p37). Taylor￿ s notation for the distribution of ages is ￿i￿1 rather than ￿s
i here:
both notations have ￿i for the distribution of durations across workers/￿rms.
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across ￿rms resetting prices. The more frequent price setters (shorter con-
tracts) have a higher representation relative to longer contracts. Note that
the rhs denominator of (5a) is the product of the contract length and the
proportion of ￿rms resetting price. For the values of i < ￿ !￿1 , the share
of the duration i is greater across contracts than ￿rms: for larger i > ￿ !￿1
the share across contracts is less than the share across ￿rms. Using equa-
tion (5a), we can move simply between the distributions across contracts and
across ￿rms. From (5a); the mean length across all contracts ￿ d (which also






i = ￿ !
￿1 (6)
The mean contract length taken over all contracts in steady state is the
reciprocal of the proportion of ￿rms resetting price. This is precisely the
"frequency based" estimate of mean contract length that has been commonly
used empirically (see for example Bils and Klenow 2004, Barhad and Eden
2004) and also for calibration purposes in models of price-stickiness (for ex-
ample, Clarida et al 1999 p.1666). However, it should be clear that this is the
mean of the wrong distribution: it is the mean across ￿rms resetting price, not
all ￿rms. There is clear length biased sampling: the shorter contracts (more
frequent price resetters) are oversampled, resulting in an underestimate of
nominal rigidity.
In the study of unemployment, each spell of unemployment is treated as
an observation and the identity of the person involved is irrelevant. Hence
the focus in the unemployment literature on the duration of unemployment
has been on the ￿ ow of new spells of unemployment and how long they
will last, rather than on the stock of unemployed9. In demography and
evolutionary biology, each duration corresponds to a single individual, hence
since people only live once, the distribution across people is exactly the same
as the distribution across individual durations: hence the focus here is also on
cohort studies, exploring the distribution of ages, hazard rates and lifetimes
across people born at the same time. The key di⁄erence in this paper arises
because we are interested in the pricing behaviour of ￿rms: hence whilst the
9However, Akerlof and Main (1981) did suggest using the average duration across all
the unemployed as an important indicator (see the ensuing debate Carlson and Horrigan
1983, Akerlof and Main 1983).
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the stock of ￿rms is what determines price stickiness.
2.2 Evidence from micro data: prices are stickier than
we thought!
There are now several studies using micro price data: in particular the In-
￿ation Persistence Network (IPN) across the Eurozone has been particu-
larly comprehensive10. These studies adopt a common methodology using
monthly micro CPI data across several countries. Here we will consider
Alvarez and Hernando (2004) for Spain (covering 1994-2003), Veronese et
al (2005) for Italy (covering1996-2003), Baudry et al (2004) for France (cov-
ering 1994-2003). All these studies have data on individual products sold
at individual outlets. Their terminology of a "price spell" (analogous to
unemployment spell) is the same as our lifetime of a contract. They also
have trajectories for prices: this is the sequence of price spells for a product
at an individual outlet. We can think of each trajectory as analogous to the
sequence of price contracts for an individual ￿rm. These papers all provide
estimates of the average length of a price spell: both across the population
of all price spells (corresponding to ￿ d in equation 6) and also across trajec-
tories, where a mean duration is calculated for each trajectory and then the
average is taken across trajectories (corresponding to ￿ T). There are many
detailed empirical issues to do with weighting, censoring and the introduction
of the Euro which we ignore here. However, we can ￿nd the direct estimates
of average durations taken across ￿rms (all durations are in months) and
contracts:
￿ Italy11: ￿ d = 8; ￿ T = 13:
￿ France12: ￿ d = 5:28; ￿ T = 7:24:
10See Dhyne et al (2005) for a summary of the IPN￿ s ￿ndings.
11Veronese et al (2005), Table A2.
12Baudry et al (2004) page 16. Note, the estimate of ￿ d is only for unweigthed data.
A trajectory in the French data is does not correspond to our concept of a complete
trajectory over the whole period: the average length of trajectories is only 17 months.
Our ￿ T is taken to be their ￿ TW: This will be an underestimate, becuase there are broken
rather than complete trajectories.
16
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￿ Spain13: ￿ d = 6:2; ￿ T = 14:7:These studies give the empirical distributions of contract lengths (price
spells), but not across ￿rms (trajectories). The distributions are very skewed:
there are many short spells and a very long tale of long spells. The mean
length of price-spells is 2-3 quarters. The empirical evidence shows that when
you take the distribution across ￿rms rather than across contracts, you get
much longer average durations of 4-5 quarters (except for France) which is
much more in line with the conventional wisdom and survey evidence that
average durations are around 1 year.
2.3 Examples.
In this section we provide six examples of how our steady state indetities
work. In the ￿rst column we state the reset probabilities (hazard rates)
f!ig; in the second and third the corresponding distribution of agesf￿s
ig






contracts (￿rms resetting prices). In the bottom row we compute the pro-
portion of new contracts ￿ !, the average age of contracts ￿ s and the average










!2 = 0 ￿s
2 = 1
40 ￿2 = 0 ￿d
2 = 0
!3 = 0 ￿s
3 = 1
40 ￿3 = 0 ￿d
3 = 0
!4 = 1 ￿s
4 = 1




￿ ! = 37
40 ￿ s = 23
20 ￿ T = 13
10
￿ d = 40
37
In this example, there are two lengths of contracts: 90% are 1 period
and 10% 4 periods. Note that ￿ d < ￿ s < ￿ T: because of the proliferation
of short contracts, the mean lifetime across contracts is even less than
the average age across ￿rms (in all the other examples, ￿ d > ￿ s).
13Alverez and Hernando (2004). ￿ T is taken from Table 6.1 Panel C. There is no direct
measure of ￿ d using the CPI weights (Panel A.gives the unweighted mean). The value
quoted is derived from the inverse of the reset frequency for each sector aggregated using
the CPI weights (page 13).
14Note that the value of ￿ ! is computed directly from the hazards !i; likewise ￿ d from
￿d
i. The fact that ￿ ! = ￿s
1 = ￿ d￿1 re￿ ects the consistency of the identities.
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!3 = 1 ￿s
3 = 3




￿ ! = 8
17 ￿ s = 29
17 ￿ T = 41
17
￿ d = 17
8
This example has a gently rising reset probability, with the shares of
completed contracts across ￿rms increasing with length of contract, as























!4 = 1 ￿s
4 = 3




￿ ! = 32
71 ￿ s = 128
71 ￿ T = 185
71
￿ d = 71
32
This is similar to example 2, with a rising hazard over four periods.
The shares across ￿rms and contracts both peak at period 3 with a
small 4-period share.
Example 4: Simple Taylor 4.
!1 = 0 ￿s
1 = 1
4 ￿1 = ￿d
1 = 0
!2 = 0 ￿s
2 = 1
4 ￿2 = ￿d
2 = 0
!3 = 0 ￿s
3 = 1
4 ￿3 = ￿d
3 = 0
!4 = 1 ￿s
4 = 1
4 ￿4 = ￿d
4 = 1
￿ ! = 1
4 ￿ s = 5
2 ￿ T = ￿ d = 4
A simple lesson can be derived from example 4. When all contracts
have the same length, the distribution across contracts is the same as
the distribution across ￿rms.
Example 5: Taylor￿ s US economy We can now consider an example start-
ing from an empirical distribution of completed contract lengths we can
derive the corresponding GC: Taylor￿ s US economy represents the es-
timated distribution of completed contract lengths15 (in quarters) in
the third column. We can represent this in terms of the distribution of
15In fact, in Taylor (1993), the ages are estimated but not reported. In Table 2.2 page




: in the text, it says that "contract lengths in the three to four quarter range appear
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distribution over contracts and the resultant averages.
!1 = 0:2017 ￿s
1 = 0:3470 ￿1 = 0:07 ￿d
1 = 0:2017
!2 = 0:3430 ￿s
2 = 0:2770 ￿2 = 0:19 ￿d
2 = 0:2738
!3 = 0:4213 ￿s
3 = 0:1820 ￿3 = 0:23 ￿d
3 = 0:1825
!4 = 0:4986 ￿s
4 = 0:1052 ￿4 = 0:21 ￿d
4 = 0:1513
!5 = 0:5682 ￿s
5 = 0:0528 ￿5 = 0:15 ￿d
5 = 0:0865
!6 = 0:5849 ￿s
6 = 0:0228 ￿6 = 0:08 ￿d
6 = 0:0384
!7 = 0:6038 ￿s
7 = 0:0095 ￿7 = 0:04 ￿d
7 = 0:0165
!8 = 1 ￿s
8 = 0:0037 ￿8 = 0:03 ￿d
8 = 0:0108
￿ ! = 0:3470 ￿ s = 2:365 ￿ T = 3:730 ￿ d = 2:8818
It is interesting to note that here, unlike examples 1-4, we can really
see the di⁄erence between the distribution across contracts and across
￿rms: in the distribution across contracts durations 1 and 2 are really
boosted - we see a lot of shorter contracts. All the other durations are
reduced, and in particular the longer contract lengths are much less
common in the distribution across contracts and across ￿rms. The
resultant mean duration is 77% of the mean across ￿rms.
Example 6: Simple Calvo The Calvo model most naturally relates to the
hazard rate approach to viewing the steady state distribution of dura-
tions. The simple Calvo model has a constant reset probability ! (the
hazard rate) in any period that the ￿rm will be able to review and if
so desired reset its price. This reset probability is exogenous and does
not depend on how long the current price has been in place. We can
think about a sequence of uninterrupted periods without any review as
the "contract length". The distribution of ages of contracts is
￿s = ! (1 ￿ !)
s￿1 : s = 1:::1
which has mean ￿ s =
P1
s=1 ￿s:s = !￿1. Applying Proposition 1(a) gives




i￿1 : i = 1:::1 (7)
to predominate". The third column which is reported as f￿ig is monotonic so may be
ages. We have not been able to ￿nd an interpretation of Table 2.2 which is consistent
with the steady state identities in this paper.
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September 2006which has mean ￿ T = 2!￿1 ￿ 1 (see Dixon and Kara 2006). Note that
for the simple Calvo model, the distribution of ages is the same as the
distribution across contracts: substituting (7) into (5) yields ￿s
i = ￿d
i
i = 1:::1, so that the mean age of contracts across ￿rms equals the
mean lifetime across new contracts and is the reciprocal of the reset
probability. We illustrate the simple Calvo model with ! = 0:25.
!1 = 0:25 ￿s
1 = 0:25 ￿1 = 0:0625 ￿d
1 = 0:25
!2 = 0:25 ￿s
2 = 0:1875 ￿2 = 0:09375 ￿d
2 = 0:1875
!3 = 0:25 ￿s
3 = 0:1406 ￿3 = 0:10546875 ￿d
3 = 0:1406
!4 = 0:25 ￿s
4 = 0:1052 ￿4 = 0:10546875 ￿d
4 = 0:1052
!i = 0:25 ￿s
i = 0:25(0:75)





￿ ! = 0:25 ￿ s = 4 ￿ T = 7 ￿ d = 4
3 Pricing Models with steady state distribu-
tions of durations across ￿rms.
Having derived a uni￿ed framework for understanding the set of all possible
steady state distributions of durations across ￿rms, we can now see how this
can be used to understand commonly used models of pricing behaviour based
on generalisations of Taylor and Calvo.
The Generalised Taylor Economy GTE Using the concept of the Gen-
eralised Taylor economy GTE developed in Dixon and Kara (2005a),
any steady-state distribution of completed durations across ￿rms ￿ 2
￿F￿1can be represented by the GTE with the sector shares given by
￿ 2 ￿F￿1 : GTE (￿). In each sector i there is an i￿period Taylor
contract, with i cohorts of equal size (since we are considering only
uniform GTEs): The sector share is given by ￿i: Since the cohorts
are of equal size and there as many cohorts as periods, there are ￿i:i￿1
contracts renewed each period in sector i. This is exactly as required
in a steady-state. Hence the set of all possible GTEs is equivalent
to the set of all possible steady-state distributions of durations. It is
simple to verify that the age-distribution in a GTE is given by (4). If
we want to know how many contracts are at aged j periods, we look at
sectors with lifetimes at least as large as j, i = j:::F. In each sector
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We simply sum over all sectors i ￿ j to get (4). The simple Taylor
economy (ST) is a special case where there is only one sector and one
contract length.
The Generalised Calvo model (GC). The representation of the steady-
state distribution by hazard rates suggests generalising the Calvo model
to allow for the reset probability (hazard) to vary with the age of the
contract (a duration dependent hazard rate), as in Wolman (1999),.
This we will denote the Generalised Calvo Model GC. A GC is de-
￿ned by a sequence of reset probabilities: as in the previous section
this can be represented by any ! 2 [0;1)F￿1. From observation 1,
given any possible GC there is a unique age pro￿le ￿s 2 ￿
F￿1
M corre-
sponding to it and a unique distribution of completed contract lengths
from Proposition 1. Again, Proposition1, if we have a distribution of
completed contract lengths, there is a unique GC which corresponds
to it. Thus, the two approaches to modelling pricing: the GTE and
the GC are comprehensive and coextensive, both being consistent with
any steady-state distribution of durations16.
The Multiple Calvo Model (MC). In this approach, the economy is seen
of as comprising several sectors, each with a simple Calvo process (i.e.
a sector speci￿c hazard/reset probability). Alvarez et al (2005) argue
that an aggregate hazard rate declines over time and that this can be
attributed to the heterogeneity of hazard rates. We can de￿ne a mul-
tiple Calvo process MC as MC (￿ !;￿) where ￿ ! 2 (0;1]n gives a sector
speci￿c hazard rate17 ￿ !k for each sector k = 1;:::n and ￿ 2 ￿
n￿1 is the
vector of shares ￿k.
We can thus see that all of the Above models generate a steady state
distribution of durations. We can ask which pricing models do not yield a
steady state. The important thing to note about the above models is that
16Note that an alternative parameterization of the duration dependent hazard rate
model is to specify not the hazard rate at each duration, but rather the probability of
the completed contract length at birth (see for example Guerrieri 2004). The probability
at birth fi of a contract lasting exactly i periods is simply the probability it survives to
period i and then resets at i : fi = ￿i!i:
17The notation here should not be confused: the substrcripts k are sectoral: none of the
sectoral calvo reset probabiltities are duration dependent in the MC model.
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of the economy: it is essentially the result of an an exogenous process which
terminates contracts. Thus even though the ￿rm or the economy are not
in steady state, the distribtion of durations is invariant. State dependent
or menu cost models do not have this property (for example Dotsey et al
1999). When the economy is in steady state they do posses a steady state
distribution of durations. However, the state of the economy a⁄ects the
duration of contracts, which means that when the economy is out of steady
state (due to an exogenous shock of some kind), durations of contracts may
also deviate from the steady state.
3.1 Modelling a Multiple Calvo economy as a Gener-
alised Taylor and Generalised Calvo economy.
Having identi￿ed three di⁄erent pricing models, we can use the uni￿ed frame-
work to show how we can move betweeen them. The example we will use is
the MC model: we will show how to model this as a GTE and a GC with
the same steady state distribution of durations across ￿rms. So, let us take
as the starting point the multiple-Calvo porcess MC (￿ !;￿). To model this
as a GTE, we can take the distribution of duration within each sector: let
￿ki be the proportion of i period contracts in the k;from (7) we have:
￿ki = ￿ !ki(1 ￿ ￿ !k)
i￿1
The proportion of i period contracts across the whole economy, ￿i is obtained





Hence we can represent MC (￿ !;￿) by GTE (￿) using (8).
From this distribution of completed durations, we can construct the cor-
responding GC from Proposition 1(b). The ￿ ow of new contracts is ￿ ! and
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k=1 ￿k￿ !k (1 ￿ ￿ !k)
i+j￿1
Proposition 2: The aggregate GC model corresponding to MC model has
a declining hazard rate. In the limit as i ! 1, the hazard rate in the
GC tends to the lowest hazard rate in the MC.
Clearly, the aggregate hazard in the GC corresponding to an MC is
decreasing over time: !i > !i+1. The way to understand this is that sectors
with higher ￿ !k tend to change contract sooner. So, for a given cohort, the
relative share of sectors with higher ￿ !k tends to go down. At any duration i,
the share of type k contracts increases if the reset probability is below average
or decreases if it is above average. The reset probability gradually declines
and asymptotically reaches the lowest reset probability. In the long-run, the
type with the lowest reset probability comes to dominate and the GC tends
to this lowest vale.
4 The Typology of Contracts and Aggrega-
tion.
In terms of contract structure, we can say that the following relationships
hold:
￿ GC = GTE = SS. The set of all possible steady state distributions
of durations is equivalent to the set of all possible GTEs and the set
of all possible GCs.
￿ C ￿ MC ￿ GC. The set of distributions generated by the Simple
Calvo is a special case of the set generated by MC which is a special
case of GC.
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the aggregate period i hazard is !i which we can either de￿ne in terms of￿ ST \MC = ?. Simple Taylor contracts are a special case of GC, but
not of MC.
Figure 1: The typology of Contracts
This is depicted in Fig 1. The GC and the GTE are coextensive, being
the set of all possible steady-state distributions (Proposition 1). The Simple
calvo C (one reset probability) is a strict subset of the Multiple Calvo process
MC which is a strict subset of the GC. The simple Taylor ST and the
MC are disjoint. The ST is a strict subset of the GTE: The size of the
distributions is re￿ ected by the Figure: ST has elements corresponding to
the set of integers and is represented by a few dots; Calvo is represented by
the unit interval; MC by the unit interval squared.
We can now ask the question: if we aggregate over two contract structures,
what is the type of contract structure that results? This is an important
question: if we believe that the economy is heterogenous, we should not
represent it with a contract type which is not closed under aggregation. We
can think of this in terms of giving each contract structure a strictly positive
proportion of the total set of contracts; for example 50%: We can de￿ne the
ST in terms of contract length, under the assumption that each cohort is of
equal size.
ST(k) + ST(j) = GTE ((0:5;0:5);(k;j))
Clearly, if we aggregate over Standard Taylor contracts with di⁄erent contract
lengths k > j, we no longer have a Standard Taylor contract but a GTE.
Similarly, if we aggregate over simple Calvo contracts with di⁄erent reset
probabilities, we do not get a C contract but a multiple Calvo MC:
C(!1) + C (!2) = MC ((0:5;0:5);(!1;!2))
By de￿nition, If we aggregate over MCs, we still have an MC. We can say
that a type of contract structure is closed under the operation of aggrega-
tion if we aggregate two di⁄erent contracts of that type and the resultant
contract structure is also of the same type. Clearly, neither the ST or C
are closed under aggregation. However, MC;GC, and GTE are all closed
under aggregation:
Observation MC, GC, and GTE are all closed under aggregation.
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contract lengths F1 and F2 respectively and w:l.o.g: F1 ￿ F2: The corre-
sponding vector of sector shares is then ￿j 2 ￿F2￿1, j = 1;2 where we set
￿1i = 0 for i > F1. If we combine the two GTEs, we get another GTE with
the sector shares being the average of the other two.









Hence GTEs are closed under aggregation. Similarly, since GCs can be
represented as equivalent GTEs; the closure of GTEs implies the closure
of GC under aggregation.MC are closed, since we can simply combine the
di⁄erent !i from each MC and reweight on a 50-50 basis. We have illustrated
the proof using two distributions with a 50-50 combination. The idea obvi-
ously generalises to a convex combination of any number of MC, GTE and
GCs:
The importance of this observation is that if we really do believe that
contract structures are heterogeneous, we should use contract types that
are closed under aggregation. The simple Calvo and Taylor models are
only applicable if there is one type of contract and no heterogeneity in the
economy. If we believe the Calvo model, but that reset probabilities are
heterogenous across price or wage setters, then the MC makes sense. If we
believe that the Calvo model is not a good one, then the GC or GTE is
appropriate.
5 The Forward Lookingness of pricing rules.
We have developed a general framework for understanding steady-state dis-
tributions of durations across ￿rms and how they are related in terms of
pricing models. In this section we consider how pricing models di⁄er when
we control for the distribution of durations (requiring the steady state dis-
tributions to be the same) in terms of the "Forward Lookingness" (FL) of
the pricing rules. A pricing rule uses data from the present and future in
order to determine the optimal price. In a log-lineraised form, this gives the
current price as a linear function of data from each date ahead. The forward
lookingness of a pricing rule takes the weights (normalised to unity) in the lin-
earised decision rule and is the resultant average over the dates ahead. This
simple measure capures the extent to which the future in￿ uences the pricing
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September 2006decision, and is applicable across all pricing rules.18. This concept was intro-
duced in Dixon and Kara (2005) to compare the simple Calvo model and the
equivalent GTE (named the Calvo-GTE). The Calvo-GTE is a model with
exactly the same distribution of completed contract lengths as in the Calvo
model, as given by (7b). We now generalise this to the GC framework. In
this paper we ignore discounting, since it applies to all pricing rules: however,
whilst it would be simple to generalise the formulae to allow for discounting,
the no-discount case allows us to understand the di⁄erences more clearly.
Let the optimal price (or target variable in general) in period t + s be
P ￿




s=0. In a GC with ! 2 [0;1)F￿1 ; the proportion of ￿rms resetting
price at time t is ￿ ! and they all set the same reset price XGC
t : Ignoring
discounting, the reset wage and forward lookingness19 FL are:
X
GC













The weights in the GC are the distribution of ages ￿s
j. This means that the
forward lookingness of the GC is simply the average age of the distribution:
FL





j = ￿ s (10)
In the corresponding GTE there are F sectors, with contract lengths




18Note that Forward Lookingness is not in general equal to the expected duration of the
contract when the price is set (life expectation at birth). They are equal in the simple
Calvo model because it has the special property that life expectancy at birth equals the
average age. For example, in the simple Taylor model without discounting FL = ￿ s, but
life expectation at birth equals the full length of the contract (average completed contract
length ￿ T):
19Note that Forward Lookingness is not in general equal to the expected duration of the
contract when the price is set (life expectation at birth). They are equal in the simple
Calvo model because it has the special property that life expectancy at birth equals the
average age. For example, in the simple Taylor model, FL = ￿ s, but life expectation at
birth equals the full length of the contract (average completed contract length ￿ T):
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The important thing to note about (11) is that the longer contract lengths
are under-represented amongst resetters relative to the population, since they
reset prices less often. This means that the forward lookingness of those
making the pricing decision is much less than the average contract length.




































































It is illuminating to write the GTE weights in terms of the GC weights.
In the GTE, each price setter knows the exact length of the contact: hence
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In contrast, in the GC the price-setter is uncertain of the contract length
and must always consider the possibility of lasting until the longest duration
F. As we identi￿ed in Dixon and Kara (2005), this results in the fact that
comparing the GTE to the GC weights, weight is "passed back" from longer






















There are three components of bj in (13): the corresponding ￿s
j, the weight
passed back to more recent dates i < j and thirdly the weight it receives
from longer contracts which include . To translate from ￿s
j to bj, you need
to correct by a factor of !j=￿ ! for each duration j: in the simple Calvo model
this is unity and the equation reverts to Dixon and Kara (2005). This means
that the bjs put a greater weight on the immediate future and less on the
more distant future than the corresponding GC. We can see this if we look
at the cumulative weights: looking at the sum of weights up to q periods
ahead, the sum of bjs is the sum of Cjs plus the weights passed back from

















The intuition behind this result is the following. In the GC, all ￿rms
are uncertain about how long the price they set will last: all ￿rms have to
take into account the optimal price for all F periods. This results in the
optimal weights for each future period being the corresponding age shares. In
the GTE, however, ￿rms only worry about the prices that cover the known
contract length. Thus ￿rms with perfectly ￿ exible prices can ignore the
future when they set prices. Firms with i period contracts just look i periods
ahead. The only people to worry about the optimal price F ￿ 1 periods
ahead are the ￿rms with F period contracts. However, they also have to
worry about all the prices along the way. Thus, when we consider (13), the
bit "passed back" re￿ ects the fact that the i period contracts have to take
into account the periods up to i: the bit received from longer contracts is the
corresponding bit they pass back to period i.
We can illustrate the di⁄erences in forward lookingness using the some of
the examples we considered before in section 3.1. Since the GC weights are
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i and were given previously as fractions in section 2.2,
we state them here as decimals to 4 decimal places. The bj coe¢ cients are
give as both exact fractions and decimals.
Example 1
￿s
1 = 0:925 b1 = 0:9521 = 457
480
￿s
2 = 0:025 b2 = 0:0271 = 13
480
￿s
3 = 0:025 b3 = 0:0146 = 7
480
￿s
4 = 0:025 b4 = 0:0063 = 1
160




1 = 0:4706 b1 = 9
16 = 0:5625
￿s
2 = 0:3530 b2 = 5
16 = 0:3125
￿s
3 = 0:1765 b3 = 2
16 = 0:125




1 = 0:4507 b1 = 71
128 = 0:5547
￿s
2 = 0:3380 b2 = 39
128 = 0:3047
￿s
3 = 0:1690 b3 = 15
128 = 0:1172
￿s
4 = 0:0423 b4 = 3
128 = 0:0234
FLGC = 1:803 FLGTE = 1:609
Clearly, in all three examples the GTE corresponding to a GC puts a
much greater weight on the current period and less on the subsequent periods,
resulting in a less forward looking pricing decision. In example 1, the weight
is still greater on the second period, but falls o⁄ rapidly.
Lastly, we can consider the case of a MC process. In this case, the
forward lookingness of the MC is simply the average of the Forward look-








￿k￿ sk = ￿ s
where ￿ sk is the average age in steady state in the k￿sector, and ￿ s the average
age in the population. Since by construction the MC and the equivalent
GC have the same distribution of ages in steady state and hence average age
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lookingness, FLGC = FLMC. Furthermore, we can see that the average
reset price at time t will be equal.
In the MC, there will be di⁄erent reset prices, one for each ￿ !k. Hence
















j=1 is the steady-state age-distribution for those with hazard ￿ !k.































Hence the average reset price in the MC is the same as the equivalent GC
setting. This means that when modelling an economy with heterogeneous
Calvo contracts as in the MC model, it may well be the most parsimonious to
use the GC framework. The degree of forward lookingness and the average
reset price are the same. The only di⁄erence is that in MC there are as
many reset prices as hazard rates, whereas in the GC there is only one.reset
price in any one period.
6 Price Data: an application to the Bils-Klenow
Data set.
In this section, we apply our theoretical framework to the Bils-Klenow Data
set (Bils and Klenow 1994). This data is the micro-price data collected
monthly for the US CPI over the period 1995-7. The BK data covers 350
categories of commodities comprising 68.9% of total consumer expenditure.
They focus on the proportion of prices that change in a month in each cate-
gory (sector). They then derive the distribution of durations across contracts
on the assumption that there is a sector speci￿c Calvo reset probability in
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contracts is not the right way to quantify price-stickiness.
In this section I use the BK data to construct the distribution of contract
lengths across ￿rms. Each sector has a sector-speci￿c average proportion of
￿rms resetting their price per month over the period covered. I interpret
this as a Calvo reset probability in discrete time20. We adopt the discrete
time approach in order to be consistent with the pricing models which are
in discrete time. The ￿rst approach we adopt is to model this as a Multiple
Calvo process BK ￿MC. The second is to model the resulting distribution
across all sectors. Within each sector we have the Calvo distribution of
contract lengths as derived in Dixon and Kara (2006a): using the sectoral
weights we can then aggregate across all sectors. This gives us the following
distribution of contract lengths depicted in Figure 2:
Fig 2: the BK Distribution of Contract lengths Across Firms
Note that the mean of 4.4 quarters is larger than is reported in BK. This
is because we are looking at the mean duration across ￿rms rather than
contracts and hence we are more likely to observe longer contracts. With the
aggregate distribution of contract lengths we can model this as either a GTE
or a GC as well as an MC. We therefore have three di⁄erent pricing models
of the same distribution of contract lengths derived from the BK dataset.
6.1 Pricing Models Compared.
We will see how the di⁄erent models of pricing di⁄er in terms of their impulse-
response. We adopt the model of price or wage setting developed in Dixon
and Kara (2005a, 2006): the details are set out in the appendix. We con-
sider two monetary policy shocks: in the ￿rst case there is a one o⁄ perma-
nent shock in the level of the money supply; in the second an autoregressive
20The use of continuous time leads to a lower expected expected duration at birth. If
the proportion resetting price is ￿ !, the expected duration at birth is ￿1=In(1￿ ￿ !). This
is less than the discrete time expectation 1=￿ !, partly re￿ ecting the fact that the price
might change more than once in a given period. The di⁄erence gets proportinatley larger
as ￿ ! gets larger. When ￿ ! = 0:8 the discrete time estimator is over twice the continuous
time estimator. The analysis in this paper is in discrete time becuase that is how the
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process
mt = mt￿1 + "t
"t = ￿"t￿1 + ￿t
where ￿t is a white noise error term. We consider the case of ￿ = 0 and
the autoregressive case ￿ = 0:5. The other key parameter ￿ captures the
sensitivity to the ￿ exible price to output. The optimal ￿ exible price at
period t in any sector p￿
t is given by
p
￿
t = pt + ￿yt
where (pt;yt) are aggregate price and output (all in log-deviation form). We
allow for two values of ￿ = f0:01;0:2g: a high one and a low one as discussed
in Dixon and Kara (2006b).
Fig 3: Responses to a one-o⁄ monetary Shock.
In Figure 3, we depict the responses of output, the reset price, the general
price level and in￿ ation to a one-o⁄ shock with ￿ = 0:2. Looking at all the
graphs, it is striking that the three models of pricing have fairly similar
impulse-responses: none of them are far apart. However, in all cases the
MC and the GC are close together and the GTE is farther away, particularly
towards the end. To understand this, we can look at the IR for the average
reset price and the general price level. In the GTE case, the reset price
rises less on impact than the MC or GC. This re￿ ects the greater myopia:
those cohorts resetting prices look less far ahead on average, so that they do
not raise prices as much as in the MC or GC case. At about 10 months
however, the situation is reversed: the GTE reset price exceeds the MC and
GC case: whilst the latter are slowing down price increases in anticipation
of the approaching steady state, the GTE maintains momentum for longer.
This comparative myopia of the GTE explains why the output response
starts o⁄ above both the MC and GC, but ends up after 15 months below
both.
Fig 4: Serial Correlation in Monetary growth ￿ = 0:5
In Figure 4 we consider the autoregressive monetary policy shock and
concentrate on the IR for output and in￿ ation for both the high and the
low values of ￿. We ￿nd that there is now a more radical di⁄erence between
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the GTE and the other two models. If we look at in￿ ation we see that
there is a hump shape: the peak impact on in￿ ation appears after the initial
monetary shock: with the high value of ￿ it happens at 3 months: with the
low value at around 20 months. Both the MC and the GC are not hump
shaped. This re￿ ects the ￿nding in Dixon and Kara 2006b that the Calvo
model does not capture the characteristic "hump shaped" response indicated
by empirical VARS. This feature appears tp be shared by its generalisations
MC and GC.
This simple example of the IR of major variables shows how di⁄erent
models of pricing can yield di⁄erent patterns of behaviour even though the
distribution of contract lengths are exactly the same. Partly this is due to
di⁄erent degrees of forward lookingness. The MC and the GC do di⁄er
slightly, but are quite close, which re￿ ects the fact that they have the same
forward lookingness. It suggests that since the GC is computationally much
simpler (you only have to model one pricing decision for all ￿rms resetting
price, rather than one for each sector), this model might be preferred to the
MC.
6.2 Alternative Interpretations of the BK Data set.
The previous analysis was based on assuming that the true distribution
within each sector is generated by the sector speci￿c discrete time Calvo
distribution. However, this is just one hypothesis about the underlying dis-
tribution of contract lengths generating the proportion of ￿rms resetting their
price per month. Let us look at the class of GTEs that are consistent with a
particular reset proportion. Again, let us consider the set of GTEs with max-
imum contract lengths F; ￿ 2 ￿F￿1 : we can de￿ne the subset which yield a











Note that since A(￿ !) is de￿ned by a linear restriction on the sector shares
￿. We assume that ￿ ! ￿ F ￿1 in what follows, so that A(￿ !) is non-empty21.
Hence A(￿ !) ￿ ￿F￿2 and A(￿ !) is closed and bounded. Note that if ￿ ! = 1, all
21This is a purely technical assumption. If we assumed a value ￿ ! < F￿1, then even if all
contracts were at the maximum duration, there would be too many ￿rms resetting prices.
Since we are dealing with empirically relevant values, ￿ ! > F￿1 is automatically satis￿ed.￿rms must reset their price every period, so that ￿1 = 1 and A(￿ !) collapses
to a singleton. To avoid trivialities, we will restrict ourselves to ￿ ! 2 [F ￿1;1).
The average length of contracts is ￿ T (￿) =
PF
i=1 i:￿i: Let us consider
the following problems: what is the lowest (highest) average contract length
consistent with a particular reset proportion ￿ !: Mathematically, we know
that since A(￿ !) is non-empty, closed and bounded and ￿ T (￿) is continuous,
both a maximum and a minimum will exist. Turning to the minimization
problem ￿rst: we have to choose ￿ 2 ￿F￿1 to solve
min ￿ T (￿) s:t: ￿ 2 A(￿ !) (14)
Proposition 3 Let ￿￿ 2 ￿F￿1 solve (14) to give the shortest average con-
tract length ￿ T (￿).
(a) No more than two sectors i have values greater than zero
(b) If there are two sectors ￿i > 0, ￿j > 0 then will be consecutive
integers (ji ￿ jj = 1).
(b) There is one solution i⁄ ￿ !￿1 = k 2 Z+. In this case, ￿k = 1.
We can sum up the proposition by saying that the shortest average con-
tract length consistent with a given proportion of resetters is the simplest
GTE that can represent it. It is either a pure simple Taylor, or an only
slightly less simple GTE with two sectors of consecutive lengths. Note that
whilst Proposition 3 is derived for a GTE, under the equivalence established
by Proposition 1, it will also hold across all GCs. It is a distribution which
minimises mean contract length, and this distribution can be seen as either
a GTE or a GC.
We can also ask what is the maximum average contract length consistent
with a proportion of resetters:
max ￿ T (￿) s:t: ￿ 2 A(￿ !)
Proposition 4 Given the longest contract duration F, the distribution of
contracts that maximises the average length of contract subject to a
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is
￿ T
max = F (1 ￿ ￿ !) + 1
There will be one contract length with ￿F = 1 if ￿ ! = F ￿1, and ￿1 = 1 if
￿ ! = 1. For all intermediate values, ￿F:￿1 > 0.
This proposition implies that ￿ T max ! 1 as F ! 1.
Let us return to the BK data set in the light of the preceding two propo-
sitions. First, we can ask the what is the shortest average contract length
which is consistent with the BK data set. The BK data set gives us for
each sector k the proportion of ￿rms changing price: ￿ !k in any month: Fol-
lowing Bils and Klenow themselves, it is natural to interpret this as a MC,
that within each sector there is a Calvo process. This was the assumption
we used to generate Figure 2. In terms of the mean contract length in the






2 ￿ ￿ !k
￿ !k
= 4:4
Where durations are in Quarters unless otherwise speci￿ed. The minimum
average contract length within each sector is simply ￿ !k; so that the minimum









Clearly, for any data set like this (based on the proportion of ￿rms changing
price in a period), the shortest average contract length can be achieved using
the Taylor model: using the Multiple Calvo yields an average duration nearly
twice as long, with the linear relation:
￿ T
MC = 2￿ T
min ￿ 1:
The maximum average contract length is not revealed by the data set.
There are some sectors with very low percentages of price changing: coin
22Note that this exceeds the level reported by Bils and Klenow! That is becuase they
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mean contract length in that sector of 83 months (nearly 7 years). However,
the nature of the BK data set says nothing about the distribution within
the sectors, so there is no meaningful upper bound on the average length of
contracts.
Lastly, let us consider what might happen if we aggregate over all sectors









￿ 1 = 2:47
Now, clearly, since contract length is a convex function of ￿ !k, by Jensen￿ s
inequality ^ T ￿ ￿ T MC. If we use the actual BK data, we have ^ ! = 0:209 per
month, yielding the reported estimate of 2:47 quarters which is just over one
half of the "true" MC value. This shows that aggregating over sectors in
this way can be extremely misleading and will considerably underestimate
the "true " value even if one believes the Calvo story24. However, the MC
might not be the true model. Even with this degree of disaggregation,
there may well be intra-sectoral variation. Ultimately, what is needed is
the individual price data. Certainly, using data of the proportions changing
price in a period is of limited value and might not even get you into the right
ballpark. That is certainly what the BK data set tells us.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a consistent and comprehensive framework
for analyzing di⁄erent pricing models which generate steady state distribu-
tions of durations which can be used to understand dynamic pricing mod-
els. In particular, the distribution of completed contract lengths across ￿rms
(DAF) is a key perspective which is fundamental to understanding and com-
paring di⁄erent models. Any steady state distribution of durations can be
23Recall, we have the lower bound on F since F ￿ (￿ !k)
￿1 :
24This is also a ￿nding emphasised on European data: see Dhyne E. et al (2005, 13).
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as a GTE; it can also be thought of in terms of Hazard rates which suggests
the GC approach. Both the GC and the GC are comprehensive: they can
represent all possible steady states. Furthermore, they are closed under ag-
gregation. Unlike the simple Calvo and Taylor models, they are consistent
with heterogeneity in the economy.
Once we have controlled for the distribution of contract durations, we
can compare di⁄erent pricing models. The concept Forward Lookingness is
useful in comparing the way di⁄erent pricing rules put weights on the future
periods. We ￿nd that the GC is less myopic than the corresponding GTE,
echoing the ￿nding of Dixon and Kara (2005a) comparing Calvo and the
Calvo-GTE. We then illustrate this by using a standard macromodel using
the Bils-Klenow data set, which we interpret (following Bils and Klenow) as
an MC process. We see even though the distributions are identical, the
three pricing models are di⁄erent. The GC and MC are close to each other
and had the same forward lookingness. The GTE is more myopic and has a
di⁄erent impulse-response in relation to a monetary shock. In particular, for
particular parameterization, the GTE can display a hump-shaped in￿ ation
response, whereas the GC and MC never have a hump.
The analysis also has implications for how we interpret the data on the
proportion of ￿rms setting a price in a particular period. The minimum
average length consistent with this is given by the simplest GTE. There is
no reasonable upper bound unless we have an upper bound on the maximum
contract length possible. Certainly, there are severe problems of aggregation
which indicate that using such data might lead very inaccurate estimates of
average contract length. The analysis also indicates that existing estimates
of price-stickiness are biased downwards and that in reality prices are stickier
than some have maintained.
Our analysis has looked at one type of wage or price setting behaviour:
the contract consists in the setting of a nominal price or wage that persists
throughout the contract. As we show in Dixon and Kara (2006b), other
types of price and wage setting can be dealt with in this framework. For
example, we can have Fischer contracts, where ￿rms or unions set a trajectory
of nominal prices over the life of the contract. This is essentially the approach
taken by Mankiw and Reis (2002). There are other possibilities such as
indexation during the contract once the initial level has been ￿xed. We
can have any model of pricing so long as it is consistent with a steady state
distribution of durations. The main class of pricing models that do not
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September 2006give a steady state distribution are of course the state-dependant pricing
models (menu cost models), such as Dotsey, King and Wolman. (1999).
Here the duration or contracts depends on the macroeconomic environment.
However, this paper makes an attempt to improve our understanding of the
steady state, which will in turn provide a ￿rmer foundation for understanding
non-steady state phenomena.
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9.0.1 Proposition 1(a)
Proof. From observation 1, the ￿ ow of new contracts is ￿s
1 = ￿ ! each pe-
riod. To survive for exactly i periods, you have to survive to period i which
happens with probability ￿i, and then start a new contract which happens
with probability !i. Hence from a single cohort ￿ !:!i:￿i will have contracts
that last for exactly i periods. We then sum over the i cohorts (to include
all of the contracts which are in the various stages moving towards the their
￿nal period i) to get the expression. The mean completed contract length ￿ T





























































Substituting the value of ￿ ! into (15) establishes the result.
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Proof. The proportion of ￿rms that have a contract that last for exactly
1 period are those that are born (age 1) and do not go on to age 2. The
proportion of ￿rms that last for exactly i periods in any one cohort (born
at the same time) is given by those who attain the age i but who do not






per cohort and at any time t there are
i cohorts containing contracts that will last for i periods.
Clearly, since ￿s

































Hence ￿ 2 ￿F￿1:
The relationship between the distribution of ages and lifetimes can be

















1 ￿1 0 0
0 2 ￿2 0
0 0 3 ￿3





















Clearly, the 4￿4 matrix is a mapping from ￿3 ! ￿3: since the matrix is of
full rank, the mapping from ￿s to ￿ is 1 ￿ 1. Clearly, this holds for any F.
9.0.4 Corollary 1(b):
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9.1 Proof of Proposition 2.















the period i hazard rate is the !i is the average of the hazard rates taken
over the survivors to i. Note that k and j subscripts refer to the sectoral
calvo reset probabilities: !i the aggregate duration dependent reset, which
is a weighted sum of the sectoral reset probabilities, the weights being given






￿k￿ !k (1 ￿ ￿ !k)
i￿1
Pn
k=1 ￿k￿ !k (1 ￿ ￿ !k)
i￿1 share of k in survivors
I now divide up the proof into three steps.
Lemma 1 The share of survivors of type k at duration i is increasing (de-
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￿ki+1 ￿ ￿ki =
￿k￿ !k (1 ￿ ￿ !k)
i
Pn
j=1 ￿j￿ !j (1 ￿ ￿ !j)
i ￿
￿k￿ !k (1 ￿ ￿ !k)
i￿1
Pn
j=1 ￿j￿ !j (1 ￿ ￿ !j)
i￿1
=
￿k￿ !k (1 ￿ ￿ !k)
i￿1
hPn
j=1 ￿j￿ !j (1 ￿ ￿ !j)
i￿1 (￿ !j ￿ ￿ !k)
i
￿Pn
j=1 ￿j￿ !j (1 ￿ ￿ !j)
i
￿￿Pn




￿k￿ !k (1 ￿ ￿ !k)
i￿1 (!i ￿ ￿ !k)
Pn
j=1 ￿j￿ !j (1 ￿ ￿ !j)
i
= ￿ki+1
!i ￿ ￿ !k
1 ￿ ￿ !k
which establishes Lemma 1, since ￿ki+1 > 0 and 1 ￿ ￿ !k > 0.
Lemma 2 The hazard rate decreases with duration !i+1 < !i:
Proof.











!i ￿ ￿ !k





1 ￿ ￿ !k
￿ki+1 (!i ￿ ￿ !k) < 0
Since the higher vales of ￿ !k have higher weights, this sum is negative unless
all values of ￿ !k = !, in which case the hazard is constant.
Lemma 3 In the limit as i ! 1, !i ! min[￿ !k] = ￿ !1; ￿1i ! 1:
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September 2006Proof. The share of type 1￿ s in the survivors is
￿1i =
￿1￿ !1 (1 ￿ ￿ !1)
i￿1
Pn






1 ￿ ￿ !2




1 ￿ ￿ !n


















1 ￿ ￿ !k
1 ￿ ￿ !1
￿i￿1##￿1
= 1





ki = 0 for all k > 1.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Firstly we will prove (a) and (b). We do this by contradiction. Let
us suppose a solution ￿ such that ￿k > 0 and ￿j > 0 and k￿j ￿ 2 We will
then show that there is another feasible GTE ￿0 with ￿j > 0 and ￿j+1 > 0
which generates a shorter average contract length.
Let us start at the proposed solution ￿; and in particular the two sectors
k and j, whose sector shares must satisfy the two relations:














￿ is the total share of the two sectors: if there are only two sectors then
￿ = 1; if there are more than two sectors with positive shares then ￿ is equal
1 minus the share of the sectors other than j and k. Likewise, ￿ is the sum of
the contribution of these two sectors to ￿ ! less the contribution of any sectors
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￿ ￿ (k ￿ j)￿ (18)









which satis￿es the two rela-
tions above (and hence is feasible) but yields a lower average contract length.





j = j (j + 1)￿ ￿ ￿ (19)
￿
0
j+1 ￿ ￿j+1 = 2￿ ￿ j (j ￿ 1)￿
De￿ne ￿￿j+1 = ￿0
j+1 ￿ ￿j+1: What we are doing is redistributing the total
proportion ￿ over durations j and j + 1 so that the aggregate proportion of












Lastly, we show that ￿0 has a lower average contract length. Since
we leave the proportions of other durations constant, their contribution to
the average contract length is unchanged. From (18) the contribution of
durations k and j under ￿ is given by
Tk = kak + j￿j
= ￿
￿
k + (k ￿ j)
2￿
￿ kj￿
Likewise the contribution of j and j + 1 with ￿0 is given by
Tj+1 = (j + 1)￿￿j+1 + j￿
0
j
= ￿(j + 2) ￿ (j + 1)j￿
Now we show that
Tk ￿ Tj+1 = ￿
￿
k ￿ (j + 1) + (k ￿ j)
2 ￿ 1
￿
￿ ￿ (kj ￿ (j + 1)j)
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k ￿ (j + 1) + (k ￿ j)
2 ￿ 1
￿
￿ kj + (j + 1)j
￿
> ￿ [j (k ￿ j ￿ 1)] > 0
Hence
￿ T (￿) ￿ ￿ T (￿
0) = Tk ￿ Tj+1 > 0
the desired contradiction.
Hence, the GTE with the minimum contract length consistent with the
observed ￿ ! cannot have strictly positive sector shares which are not consec-
utive integers. There are at most two strictly positive sector shares.
To prove (c) for su¢ ciency, if ￿ !￿1 = k 2 Z+, then if ￿k = 1 2 A(￿ !): If
￿k < 1 any other element of A(￿ !) must involve strictly positive ￿j and ￿i
with j ￿ i ￿ 2, which contradicts the parts (a) and (b) of the proposition
already established.
For necessity, note that if ￿ !￿1 = 2 Z+; then no solution with only one
contract length can yield the observed proportion of ￿rms resetting prices.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. First, note that if the proportions are given by the equations, then
the rest of the proposition follows. I know show that these equations are
indeed the maximising ones. Assume the contrary, that there is a distrib-
ution ￿ with ￿i > 0 where 1 < i < F which gives the maximum contract
length. I show that this proposed optimum can be improved upon. Hence
the optimum must involve only durations f1;Fg and the given equations
follow automatically. So, let us take the proposed solution, with ￿i > 0. Let
us redistribute the weight on sector i between f1;Fg: In order to ensure that







￿￿i + ￿￿F = ￿i
which gives us
￿￿F = ￿i
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￿￿ T = ￿i
￿
F (i ￿ 1)
i(F ￿ 1)






￿i (i ￿ 1)(F ￿ 1)
i(F ￿ 1)
[F ￿ 1] > 0
The desired contradiction. Given that all contracts must be either 1 or F
periods long, the rest of the proposition follows by simple algebra.
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Figure 2: The BK Distribution of Contract Lenghts
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uu Fig.1. The Typology of contract types.50
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